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THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTRONIC
MARKET INTERMEDIARIES
Joseph P. Bailey
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
In this paper, we provide preliminary findings of an empirical study which supports the hypothesis that
electronic markets do not become “disintermediated” as they become facilitated by information technologies.
We explore thirteen case studies of companies participating in electronic commerce and find evidence across
markets which indicate necessary roles for electronic market intermediaries including matching suppliers and
customers, providing trust, and providing interorganizational market information.  Two specific examples
are explored in greater detail to show the unsuccessful (Bargain Finder) and successful (Agents Inc.)
identification of electronic market intermediary roles.
1. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web into a medium for market transactions can no longer be ignored by some
companies.  Web sites are established for many reasons.  This includes appealing to customers to form new relationships and
communicating with current customers to strengthen current relationships.  While the reasons to join the Web are numerous,
the decision to go online is the easy one in comparison to determining a business strategy.
Strategy for electronic commerce is partially determined by how the company connects to the Internet which in turn will affect
how customers interact with them.  A business has many ways of connecting to the Internet.  They may join an existing online
“storefront” (a collection of businesses sharing a Web site – similar to a shopping mall) or they may join the Internet alone by
developing and hosting their Web site internally, for example.  The mall owner is responsible for the upkeep of the electronic
storefront and the business is responsible for the information that resides there.  If the business chooses to internally manage
their electronic commerce strategy, they have more to manage, but they don’t have to share the rewards.  While a traditional
mall owner is able to provide many “intermediary” services in a physical world, the benefits may be reduced once the
relationship moves to an electronic market.
In particular, the intermediary in an electronic market provides very little value associated with the “traditional” roles of
intermediaries.  However, this does not mean that an intermediary will cease to exist.  In fact, we show in this paper that
electronic markets demand new tools to develop and facilitate the relationships between suppliers and customers.  This
evidence indicates that the hypothesis of “disintermediation” that is presented by Gellman (1996) may not be true.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.  In section two, we define some of the traditional roles of intermediaries.
In section three, we explore the defining characteristics of markets which make them “electronic markets.” Section four
describes the research methodology which is used to analyze the data.  Section five presents the thirteen case studies.  Section
six contains the analysis.  In that section, there is an identification of the intermediary roles that are enhanced or eliminated
with the “electronification” of the markets.  To provide more depth, we explore two specific examples companies, Bargain
Finder and Agents Inc., who are electronic market intermediaries, and analyze their success as intermediaries.  Finally, section
seven provides some preliminary conclusions of this data.
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2. ROLES OF INTERMEDIARIES
Organizations and markets do not follow one model.  Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987) discuss “markets” and “hierarchies”
which are designed to provide maximum value.  The value can be provided at different parts of the organizational model
including firms or individuals that are between customers and suppliers – intermediaries.  But, what value to they add?
The roles of intermediaries have never been thoroughly examined in any one piece of literature.  Resnick, Zeckhauser, and
Avery (1995) define search costs, lack of privacy, incomplete information, contracting risk, and pricing inefficiencies as roles
where brokers can add value.  Malone, Yates, and Benjamin (1987) define similar roles:  reducing coordination costs, problems
of asset specificity, and problems of standardization.
We combined these roles with a transaction cost (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975) analysis to speculate a complete set of roles
for intermediaries.  We identified that intermediaries exist to reduce the information asymmetries by facilitating communication
between parties, aggregating groups undergoing a transaction, and matching suppliers and customers.  The intermediary may
also add value, we hypothesize, by collecting information about transactions which spans multiple firms and can correlate this
data to provide useful marketing information.  Finally, we believe that intermediaries can reduce opportunism of transacting
parties by becoming an agent of trust.
Below is an analysis of these five roles that intermediaries provide to support market transactions for traditional markets.  We
also contrast the roles to their possible existence in electronic markets.  Electronic markets are explored in more detail in
section three.
2.1 Facilitation
Information transfer between companies is costly, especially when information contains much inarticulable knowledge.  In
these instances, an intermediary may help the flow of information by coordinating and translating the information that is sent
between the supplier and consumer.  In an electronic market, many times the supplier and customer will agree to use an
interoperable electronic commerce infrastructure (i.e., EDI or the Internet) so the value of a facilitator is reduced.  In many
ways the communications network, and the standards which lie above it, replace the facilitator role.  Therefore, this role would
have a tendency to be “disintermediated.”
2.2 Aggregation
Instead of a single firm or individual negotiating with a supplier, or a single supplier negotiating with a firm, the intermediary
can aggregate the preferences of the combined suppliers or customers to usually benefit one party – the customer.  Potential
benefits include reducing transaction costs, taking advantage of economies of scale, reducing the ability to price discriminate,
and aggregating quantities of goods.  As the traditional market moves to an electronic market, the aggregation benefits may
still exist.  However, since the costs of facilitation are lower, the supplier may try to vertically integrate the functions of an
aggregating intermediary.  Therefore, it is likely that the role will be less important in electronic markets, not more.
2.3 Matching Suppliers and Customers
The needs of consumers to match with a particular supplier and for a supplier to find an appropriate customer can be
accomplished by an intermediary who becomes a focus point for the match.  There are many reasons why this intermediary
might be better at matching suppliers and customers than if they try to search for a match separately.  Some reasons, such as
facilitation of communication between parties, relate back to other intermediary roles which are identified in this paper.
However, limiting the search space and providing a filtering mechanism are the key reasons why an intermediary is better at
matching suppliers and customers than a disintermediated market.  For example, in the real estate market, knowledge of what
homes are for sale and the ability of a rental agent to filter out possible poor matches is an intermediary role that is still valued.
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As there is a movement to electronic markets, the search costs for these markets may reduce to zero, as is suggested by Bakos
(1987).  Limiting the search space is no longer important since searching a greater space is not costly.  The filtering part of a
matching intermediary may not go away.  In fact, the greater abundance of information on communication infrastructures such
as the Internet may increase the need for intermediaries to help match suppliers and customers.  The role of Agents Inc., which
is discussed in section six, will help give insight into why this may be true.
2.4 Trust
How do a supplier and customer know that the other party will not try to take advantage of their electronic market transactions?
An intermediary is there to ensure the transaction is completed and that each side of the transaction, the supplier and customer,
will live up to their end of the bargain.  Since the intermediary is often paid by one or both parties for a successful transaction,
it is the intermediary who has the right incentive to make sure the transaction is completed.  In electronic markets, trust may
be more difficult since the mechanisms for ensuring trust through information technology are in their embryonic stages and
are not ubiquitous.  The ability for parties to falsify electronic documents or create fraudulent electronic presence is relatively
easy.  Because this authentication is currently more difficult, the trust role of an intermediary in an electronic market may
increase, not decrease, which is argued by Froomkin (1996).  Only when technologies such as digital signatures and the legal
system’s acceptance of these technologies become adopted may the trust role of an intermediary be reduced.
2.5 Interorganizational Marketing Information
Since an intermediary is privy to information across industries, the intermediary can perform correlation analysis of consumer
preferences.  An intermediary participates in transactions from multiple vendors, similar to a department store or supermarket
which carries goods from multiple vendors, so the intermediary can understand the “communities of interest” which develop.
Because they have this information they can be a more effective at matching suppliers and consumers, as is discussed above,
but they can also become an organization which supplies marketing information to suppliers.  In an electronic market, this
marketing information becomes more dynamic and easier to customize, so the intermediary can supply more accurate data.
When marketing data is in digital form, manipulating data to understand the behavior of a particular individual or groups of
individuals is much easier.  Because the intermediary can then provide more valuable marking information, the importance
of this electronic market intermediary role will increase.
3. ELECTRONIC MARKETS
An electronic market is where a supplier and a customer undergo an exchange of goods or services for money and where the
information exchange between these parties is partially or fully automated by information technology.  Malone, Yates, and
Benjamin (1987, 1989) discuss further the attributes of markets which make them an “electronic market.”  While these authors
provide a firm understanding of market characteristics, many implementations of electronic markets have since evolved which
warrant a new empirical investigation of electronic markets.  In particular, the growth of electronic data interchange (EDI) to
conduct business-to-business transactions and the growth of the Internet for business-to-consumers have provided new areas
of research within the context of electronic markets.  EDI and the Internet have very different origins, but the boundary between
them seems to be blurring lately.
EDI (Electronic Data Interchange) originated in the 1960s.  Its intended purpose was to replace paper communication with
electronic communication.  This would increase the speed of communication and ease the record keeping (there is no need to
print out an invoice from one computer system and then re-type the same information by the other party).  Since then, EDI has
grown to provide transaction standards for a wide range of electronic markets.  Today, the growth rate of EDI is approximately
45% per year with more than 90% of the Fortune 1000 companies using EDI standards (Kalakota and Whinston 1996, pp.  334).
While most EDI transactions are sent over value added networks (VANs), there is a growing number of people who send EDI-
based transactions over an even more impressively growing computer network, the Internet.
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The Internet also started in the 1960s with the ARPAnet and has grown to support electronic markets even faster than EDI.1
As Clark (1988) points out, the design philosophy of the Internet was not to reduce the transaction costs or support electronic
markets, but to provide a robust heterogeneous distributed computing environment for applications that may not yet be
developed.  Only in the past few years has the Internet been transformed to improve security and “privatize” the infrastructure.
Both of these developments have enabled electronic commerce applications.  Aside from the EDI transactions, the Internet
provides a host of applications, including electronic mail and the World Wide Web, that support electronic markets.
While electronic markets consist of more than just EDI and the Internet, we believe they provide a good subset to analyze with
empirical data since they are two of the most ubiquitous information infrastructures which already support electronic
commerce.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The data we collect comes from fourteen electronic markets.  We collected this data through interviews and surveys.  We
examined the data from each electronic market with respect to these roles in a manner consistent with the emergent perspective
of Markus and Robey (1988).  In their work, Markus and Robey define three different ways in which organizational change
can result from the introduction of information technology:  technological imperative, organizational imperative, and the
emergent perspective.  The emergent perspective defines organizational change resulting from the purposes, setting the process
of adopting information technology and, therefore, affecting the roles intermediaries play.
The theory behind our analysis is based on transaction cost economics theory of the firm (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975).  We
chose this methodology since defining the firm boundaries will help us determine the distinct players in a transaction.  Firms
that can absorb the intermediary in the electronic market become disintermediated while those that cannot remain
intermediated.  Transaction cost economics has been used before as a methodology to determine information technology and
organizational structure specifically with respect to incomplete contract theory (Brynjolfsson 1994).
The difficulty in using transaction cost economics is determining all sources of transaction costs which affect the organizational
structure.  We surveyed the literature to determine that Williamson’s use of asset specificity and Demsetz’ (1968)
characterization on the cost of transactions provide useful insights.  Based on these prior works, we determined that electronic
market transaction costs result from information asymmetries between a customer and supplier and opportunism resulting from
incomplete contracts.
The analysis from our empirical data on electronic markets is then used to determine if intermediaries provide any value to
customers by reducing the transaction costs.  They may reduce the transaction costs by taking the role of facilitation,
aggregation, matching suppliers and customers, trust, and marketing.
5. INTRODUCTION TO THE CASES
We now explore the thirteen case studies.  While we cannot disclose the names of the thirteen companies that comprise this
study due to the proprietary nature of the information, we present aggregated empirical data in the five categories that follow.
The number of companies that are included in this study follows the section titles in parentheses.
5.1 Retail – Business to Business (2)
This category includes firms who buy products of low asset specificity – they are goods which have multiple suppliers and
multiple customers.  The amount of information necessary to describe these products is fairly limited since there is considerable
The Emergence of Electronic Market Intermediaries
395
knowledge by the customer and supplier so there is fairly high standardization.  This category of retail is different than retail
to consumers since the customer is not a single person; rather they are a business themselves.  This distinction is necessary since
the nature of the relationship changes.  A business may have larger quantities exchanged at greater frequency and develop a
longer relationship with the supplier.  Furthermore, the transaction is more likely to rely on technologies such as electronic data
interchange (EDI) since they are highly standardized transactions that are anticipated.
5.2 Retail – Business to Consumers (2)
Similar to the retail business described above, this transaction involves goods that have low asset specificity and fairly high
standardization.  However, this category of companies market directly to consumers who are purchasing from their household
budget.  The channels of communication are not EDI-based and often use the benefits of Internet-based applications.
5.3 Automotive – Business to Business (2)
Five out of the total thirteen studies, perhaps a disproportionate number, were based in the automotive industry.  The subtleties
of the automotive industry, which has a higher degree of asset specificity (some car parts can only fit on one model of a car),
were reason enough for us to separate these companies into their own category.  Relative to the retail sector, the set of possible
firms to transact with is smaller (either as a customer or a supplier) and there are longer-term relationships.  This subsection
of the automotive category explores the electronic market of businesses as both suppliers and customers, not an individual.
The communication is primarily EDI-based.
5.4 Automotive – Business to Consumers (3)
Similar to the previous category, the companies we explore are in the automotive sector, which has relatively high
standardization but higher asset specificity than the retail markets.  In this sub-category, the firms investigated here cater to
an individual and not to businesses.  Because of this distinction, the relationships are not as long-lived or as complex as is the
case with business-to-business.  Also, the repetition of the transactions is lower than in the business-to-business case.
5.5 Information Goods – Business to Customers (4)
In the final category, the paper explores four firms that do not sell durable goods.  Rather, they sell information.  This is an
important category to consider when exploring electronic commerce since information technology enables communication and
manipulation of the goods, changing the good’s characteristics.
6. ANALYSIS
The importance of the roles with respect to the empirical research is summarized in Table 1.  A “+” indicates an increasing
role for intermediaries as they move from a traditional market to an electronic market.  A “-” indicates a decreasing role and
a “+/-” indicates that the increasing and decreasing characteristics of the role may not change.
Facilitation benefits of having an intermediary are reduced across all electronic markets since the common, interoperable
standards have been defined (whether it is the Web or EDI, for example).  The communication channels have been standardized
in an electronic market even though they may travel via many different media (such as electronic mail, telephone conversations,
or video conferencing).  Once the path to connect the supplier and customer has been established, discussion and information
transfer occurs without the information being filtered through an intermediary.
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Table 1.  Roles of Intermediaries for Market Categories
Facilitation Aggregation Matching Trust Marketing
Retail, Business to Business - - - + +
Retail, Business to Consumers - - + + +
Automotive, Business to Business - - - + +/-
Automotive, Business to Consumers - - + + +
Information Goods, Business to Consumers - - + + +
Aggregation benefits are reduced across all markets because firms can coordinate the aggregation and do not need an
intermediary to do this.  The retail and automotive companies explored in the study, in particular, did not use an intermediary.
While there was non-linear pricing of these goods, a customer was able to receive a better price by working with the supplier
directly and avoiding the costly “middleman” charges which would negate the economies of scale benefit.  The fifth category,
information goods, saw very little aggregation so there was no need for disintermediation.
Matching suppliers and customers becomes more important in the business-to-consumer markets, but less important in the
business-to-business markets.  Since a large percentage of the business-to-business transactions were with firms that had worked
together before, there was no need to seek out someone new.  However, the insignificant repetition of transactions with the
business-to-consumer categories indicated that there is a real need for an intermediary who has a knowledge of potential
matches to reduce the search space of a consumer.
Our data indicated that trust becomes a more important role for intermediaries in electronic markets since the intermediary has
incentive to ensure a successful transaction.  The intermediary may also establish longer term relationships with the supplier
or customer since the intermediary may participate in other transactions.  In the business-to-business cases, trust has been
provided by the network provider, usually an EDI/value added network.  The VAN provider ensures the willingness of
organizations to participate in trustworthy transactions by screening the companies as they connect to the infrastructure.  Part
of this screening process includes a high fixed cost to join the infrastructure.  Also, VANs have integrated security since the
network provider can guarantee the security of the transmission, either because they own the network themselves, or they have
agreements with the networks they interconnect with.  The Internet electronic markets analyzed showed that security is still
a problem.  Since messages sometimes get routed through networks unknown to the message originator, network security is
less certain.  Only with developments and diffusion of technology such as public key encryption will the Internet become more
secure.  This is still an important role for an intermediary and many companies are currently trying to become the trust
intermediary, by providing services such as a trusted key server, which will promote Internet electronic commerce.
Marketing becomes more important in the markets where there is lower asset specificity since higher asset specificity markets
filter the set of possible information to those with whom you previously conducted transactions.  That is why the retail market
of business-to-business showed an increasing role of marketing for intermediaries while the automotive market did not.
However, in the consumer market where there is less repetition in transactions, people can switch to a different supplier so
marketing is very important.  As will be clear late in this section, companies such as Agents Inc. can use marketing information
across goods to become an effective electronic market intermediary.
To achieve a greater level of detail in the empirical analysis, the paper investigates two companies that have defined different
strategies for a market intermediary in the same industry, music.  This analysis helps support the claim that the electronic
intermediaries are important to provide some services, while they are not useful at filling other “traditional” intermediary roles.
Therefore, electronic market intermediaries with a proper strategy will provide benefits for all parties, including themselves,
while a poor identification of intermediary roles leads to a strategy failure.
The first intermediary explored, Bargain Finder (http://bf.cstar.ac.com/bf/), has not aligned the incentives of customers and
suppliers in the compact disc (CD) market to participate in its intermediation.  Bargain Finder, developed by Andersen
Consulting, provides an intermediary search for the many CD stores on the World Wide Web.  By inputting the title and artist
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of the CD the customer would like to purchase, Bargain Finder dispatches a price query to the different Web stores to help the
customer compare prices.  Since Bargain Finder only provides users with the cost, they are promoting a Bertrand competition
game, since all companies are competing on price.  At the time of this writing, the author searched for a popular CD which
is easily available in a retail store.  Of the eight stores Bargain Finder searched, only two reported back the price.  The price
Bargain Finders reported back from the two stores was the exact same (as would be expected from a Bertrand competition
model) for the CD although they had different shipping options and prices.  The remaining six stores prevented the Bargain
Finder agent from searching their database by blocking the agent.
The second electronic market intermediary, Agents Inc. (http://www.agentsinc.com), has better identified its role as an
intermediary according to our analysis.  With their flagship product, Firefly, Agents Inc. started as a matching intermediary.
Firefly creates a community of users who have similar tastes in music.  They understand what community a user belongs to
by asking them to rate the types of music they are familiar with and try to find others who have similar tastes.  Since music
has so many inarticulable qualities, this proves to be an effective method for finding people with similar interests.  Once their
community of interest has been identified, a user can ask Firefly to recommend other music that s/he is not aware of, but may
like.  Firefly is able to construct possible new matches from the information given by others in the same community of interest.
This “collaborative filter” is a powerful way for an intermediary to provide value to all users.
However, this is only one of Agent Inc.’s intermediary roles – they also perform an important marketing role to advertisers on
the Agents Inc. World Wide Web page.  Since advertisers are looking to appeal to a specific type of customer, Agents Inc. is
able to infer consumer types based upon people’s music preferences.  For example, a person who enjoys pop music may be
younger, so they would be a more appropriate audience for video games, while a different person who listens to music from
the 1950s may be more appropriate for a luxury car.  Certainly there are some generalizations made, but Agents Inc. is looking
to complement its Firefly project with other marketing information to provide a inter-organizational and inter-market
communities of interest.
The success of Agents Inc. and the moderate failure of Bargain Finder indicates that there may be better and worse roles for
an electronic market intermediary.  The “customer information state” of the Web user who seeks help from the intermediary,
summarized in Table 2, is quite different for these two cases.
Table 2.  Customer Information State when Searching for Music
What the customer knows What the customer wants to find out
Bargain Finder What item (artist and title) that they wish to buy Where can they buy the item for the lowest price
Firefly What artists they like to listen to What other artists they may like to listen to
The relative success of Firefly when compared to Bargain Finder may be explained by looking at the incentives for
participation.  Both Bargain Finder and Firefly try to answer questions that customers have, but why would the suppliers be
willing to share information with the intermediary?  In the case of Firefly, it is fairly clear that exposing people to new music
can expand the market and increase sales.  With Bargain Finder, there is a disincentive for the supplier to disclose price
information since they will then compete on a price-only basis.
Bargain Finder and Agents Inc. demonstrate that intermediaries can play a role in an electronic market.  However, providing
value to both sides of the market is essential to avoid incentive compatibility problems.  The Bargain Finder roles of
aggregation and facilitation do not prove to meet this task.  However, the interorganizational marketing information and




While it may be true that the some traditional roles of intermediaries may be removed when information technology facilitates
communication between a customer and a supplier, there will not be a total elimination of an intermediary.  In particular, in
the markets that are based upon information technology, the electronic markets, intermediaries have increasingly important
roles.  These roles include ensuring trust, matching suppliers and customers, and providing interorganizational marketing
information.
The differences in markets also affects the role of intermediaries.  In markets where there is low asset specificity, such as retail,
there are greater possible matches so a matching intermediary is more important.  Conversely, markets with higher asset
specificity, as in the automotive industry, have a limited set of suppliers and customers that may be appropriate for a match
so the matching intermediary may not provide much value.  There is also a difference in the business-to-business and business-
to-consumer markets.  While businesses have high repetition and strong relationships, consumers are more willing to express
dissatisfaction through “exit” and not “voice” (Hirschman 1970).  In the former case, it is important for the market players to
have better ad hoc communication than the Internet enables.  In the later case, an intermediary may help reduce the search
space and introduce users to their community of interest for peer recommendations.  Finally, information intermediaries can
now tailor their products based upon the customer needs and supplier’s marketing wishes.
While more research is needed to determine the quantitative benefit of an intermediary in some markets, it is clear that
reduction of transaction costs may not be the proper metric.  As in the work of Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1996) on the
“productivity paradox,” the metrics that would quantify a transaction cost may come from an older market paradigm.  The
newer paradigm of customized goods, reduced delivery time, and greater customer satisfaction is more difficult to measure
but, as the roles of an electronic commerce intermediary may indicate, most important.
The Bargain Finder and Agents Inc. examples support the hypothesis of the changing roles of intermediaries as they emerge
in the electronic markets.  Agents Inc. has clearly identified roles which increase the benefits to all parties and take advantage
of information that it has across consumer communities and supplier organizations.  Bargain Finder may only promote
competition on price since it performs roles of aggregation and facilitation which become less important in an electronic
market.  Neither Bargain Finder nor Agents Inc. has successfully addressed the role of providing trust, but it is clear from the
differences in EDI and the Internet that a trust intermediary is important.
Finally, electronic markets growth that has been artificially separated into EDI-based and Web/Internet-based commerce no
longer seems appropriate.  As interoperability between networks, user communities, and standards becomes more accepted,
there may be heterogeneous information technologies that provide complementary, not competing, applications.
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